National versus international mergers in unionized oligopoly by Lommerud, Kjell Erik et al.
mss # Lommerud, Straume, and Sørgard; art. # 13; RAND Journal of Economics vol. 37(1)
RAND Journal of Economics
Vol. 37, No. 1, Spring 2006
pp. 212–233
National versus international mergers in
unionized oligopoly
Kjell Erik Lommerud∗
Odd Rune Straume∗∗
and
Lars Sørgard∗∗∗
We analyze how the presence of trade unions affects the pattern of mergers in an international
oligopoly and the welfare implications thereof. We ﬁnd that wages for the merger participants
are always lower when they merge internationally, rather than nationally. Using a model of
endogenous merger formation, we ﬁnd that the ﬁrms will merge internationally in equilibrium.
There are more international mergers than socially preferred, unless products are close substitutes.
A “national champion” policy of promoting domestic mergers rather than international ones is
nevertheless never optimal.
1. Introduction
 International mergers increasingly shape the industrial structure of developed and developing
economies alike.1 This is probably a natural development. At some stage, domestic economies
of scale are exhausted. In addition, economic integration means that not only trade but also the
market for corporate control is liberalized. The question remains, though, whether ﬁrms can also
have strategic reasons for choosing an international rather than a national merger. The purpose
of this article is to apply an international oligopoly model to analyze how the interplay between
the labor market and the product market may affect ﬁrms’ merger decisions. Could it be that
ﬁrms merge internationally rather than nationally to curb the market power of trade unions? If
so, will we observe a higher number of international mergers than would be optimal seen from a
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1 Gugler et al. (2003) identify ﬁve great merger waves during the past century and point out that the fraction of
international mergers has steadily increased. In 1999 the total value of worldwide cross-border mergers and acquisitions
amounted to more than 80% of world FDI ﬂows. In the same year, the share in all mergers and acquisitions that was
cross-border, in value terms, reached nearly 31% (UNCTAD, 2000, 2002).
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welfare point of view, or perhaps that international mergers supplant domestic ones to an excessive
degree?
To analyze such questions, a natural starting point would be the existing models on mergers
and merger policy in open economies.2 However, most of the existing literature is about domestic
mergers with spillovers on foreign agents, often focusing on the interplay between merger policy
and trade policy. In contrast, we focus on ﬁrms’ choice between a domestic and a cross-border
merger.3 Horn and Persson (2001a) suggest that cooperative game theory could be used to pinpoint
which industry structure will materialize when many different mergers are possible. We apply
this method to solve for the equilibrium market structure when we allow for any two-ﬁrm merger
in a situation with four ﬁrms initially.4 As a robustness check, we also describe two versions of
a noncooperative acquisition game that yield the same prediction about market structure as the
cooperative framework.5
The novel feature of the present article is the focus on the interaction between market
power in the product market and in the labor market. Already, Brander and Spencer (1988),
Davidson (1988), Dowrick (1989), and De Fraja (1993) have suggested that oligopoly power in
the product market might be an important reason why trade unions have the potential to inﬂuence
wage setting.6 Empirical studies suggest that mergers in the product market—which leads to
higher concentration—may in fact inﬂuence wages. But the picture is mixed. Some studies ﬁnd
that a merger leads to higher wages, while others ﬁnd the opposite result or no effect at all.7
Unfortunately, there are few theoretical studies that can guide us on how mergers should be
expected to affect wages. Our article helps to ﬁll this gap by showing how different types of
mergers can have distinctly different effects on wages and in turn on proﬁts and welfare.
A core idea in our article is that an international merger can tilt the power balance between
employers and workers. We study an international Cournot oligopoly with two domestic and two
foreign ﬁrms, where wages are set by monopoly trade unions. The analysis rests further on the
assumption that it is easier for workers to organize within, as opposed to across, national borders.8
This notion is most conveniently implemented by letting trade unions be national by assumption:
any ﬁrm operating in a given economy meets the wage claims of the relevant national union. As
long as there are national unions—or at least that unions within a nation cooperate more easily
than unions in different countries—then an international merger, as opposed to a national one,
will imply that the merged ﬁrm meets two uncoordinated unions.
Since we model market power both in the input (labor) and output market, a merger will
change both output prices and wages. A national merger makes market shares less sensitive to
wage changes, which gives the unions an incentive to raise wages, and more so for the ﬁrms not
taking part in the merger. An international merger, on the other hand, has a distinctly different
2 See, e.g., Dixit (1984), Barros and Cabral (1994), Long and Vousden (1995), Head and Ries (1997), Sørgard
(1997), Richardson (1999), Horn and Levinsohn (2001), Collie (2003), and Neary (2003, 2004).
3 Some articles study how ﬁrms in one country may access the market in some other country. Cross-border mergers
are studied as one alternative way of access, with greenﬁeld investment and exports as alternatives. See Norba¨ck and
Persson (2004), Bjorvatn (2004), and Bertrand (2005).
4 Horn and Persson (2001b) apply their own method to an international oligopoly situation, but do not consider
trade unions. Lommerud, Straume, and Sørgard (2005), Straume (2003), Huck and Konrad (2004), Saggi and Yildiz
(2006), Yildiz (2002), and Spearot (2004) also follow the endogenous merger track in international settings.
5 An alternative to the cooperative route is obviously to model acqusitions as a noncooperative bidding game.
See Kamien and Zang (1990) for one such model. Theories of sequential mergers, as in Nilssen and Sørgard (1998), also
picture mergers as alternatives to each other.
6 For recent work on the effect of globalization with international unionized oligopoly, see Naylor (1998), Munch
and Skaksen (2002), and Lommerud, Meland, and Sørgard (2003).
7 Brown and Medoff (1988), Cremieux and Van Audenrode (1996), and Peoples, Hekmat, and Moini (1993) ﬁnd
support for a wage cut following a merger, while McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) ﬁnd the opposite result. Hekmat (1995)
and Gokhale, Groshen, and Neumark (1995) ﬁnd no or only limited evidence of a link between takeovers and wages.
8 Formal union cooperation across national borders is rarely observed, due to historical, institutional and cultural
factors. In a survey, Marginson and Schulten (2000) conclude that “the development of any pan-European collective
bargaining structures to determine pay and major conditions at inter-sector, sector and/or multinational company levels
remains a distant prospect.”
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effect on the unions’ wage setting. An international merger would imply that the merged ﬁrm is
served by two different unions, each producing input to one of the merged ﬁrm’s two products.
Then the merged ﬁrm can partly replace sales of one of its products by increasing the sales of
the other product. Since an international merger leads to such a ﬂexibility, it triggers increased
competition between the unions. As a result, the unions compete more ﬁercely on wages.9 We also
allow for the possibility of exogenous merger synergies in the form of nonlabor cost savings for
the merger participants. The presence of such cost savings improves the competitive position of
the merged entity, which tends to increase wages for the merger participants and lower wages for
the outside ﬁrms. However, due to the effects of different types of merger on union rivalry, wages
are always lower for the merger participants if they merge cross-border rather than domestically.
Since a national merger has a potential “raising rivals’ cost” effect (when nonlabor cost
savings are not too large), while an international merger always leads to lower wages for ﬁrms not
participating in a merger, it is a priori not clear what would be the equilibrium market structure.
It turns out, though, that the stable equilibrium market structure always implies that the ﬁrms
merge internationally. This is the most effective corporate strategy to reduce union rents, thereby
leaving a larger surplus in the downstream market.
There are numerous examples of multinational ﬁrms that exploit the potential for shifting
production between plants in different countries. In Marginson and Schulten (1999) it is docu-
mented in detail that in such industries as automobile, electrical consumer products, and food
manufacturing products, the plants within multinational ﬁrms are engaged in internal competition
for both current production and future investments. One example is the German car producer
BMW, which acquired the British company Rover in 1994 (see Hall, 1998). In 1998, BMW
threatened to close down production at the Rover plant. This led to an agreement where the
workers at the Rover plant accepted a package of measures including the elimination of premium
payments for overtime and Saturday working. Another example is Electrolux, a Swedish producer
of electrical consumer products with plants in many European countries (see Paparella, 1997). It
announced in November 1997 that it planned to restructure production in Europe and close down
some plants in its subsidiary Zanussi in Italy. In December 1997, Electrolux and the trade union
at Zanussi signed an agreement in which it was decided that there would be no plant closures in
Italy. The trade union agreed on a package of measures that included lower wages, for example
that newly recruited workers would receive a lower wage than the minimum set by company-level
bargaining for the ﬁrst two years.10 Norway’s dominant chocolate producer Freia recently intro-
duced night shifts, something the union had resisted for decades. Freia is now a subsidiary of the
U.S. multinational Kraft Foods. The threat that production could be moved to some other Kraft
subsidiary abroad if productivity growth targets were not met was enough to convince the union.
Many have the impression that the role of unions is strongly in decline, which presumably
would make a theory of union wage responses to mergers less interesting. However, international
evidence is very mixed. OECD (1997) reports union coverage ﬁgures for OECD member countries
for 1980, 1990, and 1994.11 In 1994, the vast majority of OECD countries still had union coverage
rates above 70%. The relatively few countries with coverage less than 50% were the United States,
United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and Japan. De-unionization, in the sense of a stark drop
in union coverage over the period, is found only in the United Kingdom and in New Zealand. In
the United States, coverage is also sliding downward, albeit from a starting point that was very
low to begin with. A couple of countries, notably Australia and Portugal, have experienced sharp
falls in union membership, but without a corresponding change in union coverage. Leaving the
9 This could be called a “second source” argument, even though this is not second sourcing in a literal sense. The
article in the second source literature that is closest to our model (but still quite different) is Choi and Davidson (2004).
10 In a press release, the trade union stated that “the agreement means most notably that the Italian Zanussi plants
have managed to avoid being on the international list of cuts decided by Electrolux” (see Paparella, 1997).
11 Union coverage refers to the percentage of workers covered by a collective agreement, as opposed to union
density, which reports the percentage of workers who are members of unions. In some countries, coverage and density
differ substantially, with France as the famous example. There, in 1994, union coverage was 95%, while union density
was 9%.
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Anglo-American sphere, in continental Europe and Scandinavia union coverage is stable and
high.12 It is true that high union coverage does not necessarily mean that unions are as strong as
they were. The theory presented in this article is precisely how some mergers can weaken the
position of trade unions and of how ﬁrms seek out exactly those mergers. Note also that a theory
of mergers in international unionized oligopoly can also be of interest for ﬁrms that are based in
low-union-coverage countries. For example, U.S. multinationals will often be involved in mergers
with ﬁrms in unionized countries. To calculate the correct valuation of a possible takeover target
in a unionized country, a bidder needs to consider wage responses in the ﬁrms in question and in
the rest of the industry.
While ﬁrms prefer to merge internationally, it is not obvious that this is the correct choice
from a global or domestic welfare point of view. A wage reduction is a transfer from workers to
employers that by assumption does not inﬂuence social welfare by itself. However, lower wages
may in turn lead to lower product prices. If so, consumers beneﬁt as well. We ﬁnd that two inter-
national mergers is actually the most preferred market structure from a global welfare perspective
if products are sufﬁciently close substitutes—even if nonlabor cost savings are nonexistent—
implying that there is a perfect correspondence between private and social merger incentives in
this case. On the other hand, if products are sufﬁciently differentiated, there will be an excessive
number of international mergers.
Many would argue that the aim of competition authorities is not to maximize global social
welfare, but rather the domestic social welfare of one’s own country. A policy maker must then
evaluate to what extent a wage cut in the oligopolized sector is transformed into lower consumer
prices rather than higher proﬁts—and to what extent the relevant consumers and capital owners
reside in the country in question. International mergers may not always be wanted: in some
cases no merger is domestic-welfare optimal, and in others the preferred outcome is a national
merger in the foreign country. Our perhaps most interesting result is that a domestic merger is
always detrimental to domestic welfare, unless nonlabor cost savings with respect to a merger are
sufﬁciently high. This questions the idea that lax merger policy toward domestic ﬁrms, to build
up a national champion, would be a good substitute for strategic trade policy. Rather, when the
nonintervention outcome needs to be corrected, our analysis points toward strict merger policy as
pertains to both domestic and foreign ﬁrms as the optimal choice.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the structural
model and explain the merger formation process. The union wage effects of merger—the crucial
feature of the model—are analyzed and discussed in Section 3. The proﬁtability of a single two-
ﬁrm merger is brieﬂy discussed in Section 4, followed by a presentation of the equilibrium market
structure in Section 5. Implications for welfare—global and domestic—are discussed in Sections
6 and 7. In Section 8 we extend the model to allow for noncooperative merger formation. Finally,
some concluding remarks are offered in Section 9.
2. The model
 Four ex ante identical ﬁrms (owners) are located in two countries, A and B. Owners 1 and
2 are located in country A, whereas owners 3 and 4 reside in country B. Each plant produces
a speciﬁc brand of a differentiated product, and ﬁrms compete in Cournot fashion in a single
integrated market. We assume that entry to the industry is restricted, due to some ﬁrm-speciﬁc
ownership advantages of the incumbents.
The market-clearing price of brand i is given by the following inverse-demand function:
pi = a − qi − b
∑
j
q j , i, j = 1, . . . , 4, i = j, (1)
where qi is supplied quantity of brand i , and b ∈ (0, 1) is an inverse measure of the degree of
12 EEAG (2004) gives 2001 ﬁgures for union coverage for a somewhat different set of countries. The impression
is that union coverage remained stable during the latter half of the 1990s.
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product differentiation.13,14 Following Singh and Vives (1984), this demand structure is derived
from the maximization problem of a representative consumer whose utility function is given by
U = a
∑
i
qi − 12
(∑
i
q2i + b
∑
i
∑
j
qi q j
)
+ z, i, j = 1, . . . , 4; i = j, (2)
where z is a numeraire “outside” good.
The goods are produced by using labor and nonlabor inputs in a ﬁxed proportion, where
one unit of brand i requires one unit of labor—at the price wi —and a given amount of nonlabor
input(s)—at the price c. We further assume that a ﬁrm can reduce its nonlabor costs by merging
with another ﬁrm. Such exogenous merger synergies are captured by assuming that marginal
production costs for brand i are given by
wi + c(1− Diµ),
where
Di =
{
0 if ﬁrm i does not participate in a merger
1 if ﬁrm i participates in a merger,
and µ ∈ [0, 1] indicates the magnitude of the cost synergy. We preserve the ex ante symmetry of
the model by assuming that these synergies can be realized in a merger between any two ﬁrms.
Workers are organized in trade unions. A key assumption of the model is that workers are
not able to organize across borders, nor are trade unions in different countries able credibly to
coordinate their wage demands.15 We thus make the assumption that workers are organized in
country-speciﬁc industrywide unions.16,17
We adopt the monopoly union model, where wages in each country are unilaterally set by
the respective trade unions.18 The objective of each trade union is to maximize total rents for its
members,19,20 implying the following utility functions for the trade unions in countries A and B,
respectively:21
VA = (w1 − w)n1 + (w2 − w)n2, (3)
VB = (w3 − w)n3 + (w4 − w)n4, (4)
13 Only with perfect substitutability can a ﬁrm simply move the production of a brand from one plant to another.
14 Lommerud and Sørgard (1997) use a similar demand system but assume that there are ﬁxed costs associated
with establishing brands and that the number of brands is an endogenously determined choice variable.
15 A model that studies possible collusion among trade unions can be found in Straume (2002).
16 An alternative interpretation of the model is that workers are organized in plant-speciﬁc trade unions that
coordinate wage setting within—but not across—national borders.
17 EEAG (2004) documents that the countries in Western Europe that have high union coverage also typically have
wage formation predominantly at the industry level—or even more centralized. The main mechanism of the model can
survive in such a setting, if enterprise wage formation tends to be coordinated within the ﬁrm nationally after a merger,
but not internationally.
18 In the no-merger starting point, this means that all ﬁrms are unionized and all unions are equally strong. The
theory in this article is not one of capital ﬂight to nonunionized low-cost countries, but of multinationals playing equally
strong unions against each other.
19 The rent-seeking assumption is widely used as a simple union maximand. If workers are risk neutral, it coincides
with the idea of a utilitarian union that maximizes the weighted sum of its members’ utilities. See Oswald’s (1985) famous
survey for a discussion of union objectives.
20 Pemberton (1988) shows that a rent-maximizing union is equivalent to a “managerial union” with union leaders
who are interested in size (employment) and union members (represented by the median worker) who are interested in
excess wages, where the leadership and workers have equal bargaining power.
21 The Editor has pointed out that it is important for subsequent results that the cross-derivative of the union
maximand as regards wage and employment be nonnegative. If the union utility function is a utilitarian welfare function
over its members’ utilities, “employment” is simply the number of people who get utility from money. In this case, a
negative cross-derivative is implausible.
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where wi (ni ) is the wage (employment) level at plant i , and w is the outside wage (that can be
earned outside the oligopoly industry), assumed to be equal in both countries. Note that each trade
union is allowed to set different wages at different plants.
Finally, proﬁts associated with the sale of brand i are given by22
πi = [pi − wi − c(1− Diµ)]ni , i = 1, . . . , 4. (5)
The game is characterized by the following sequence of moves:23
Stage 1. The equilibrium ownership structure of the industry is determined through bargaining
between the owners.
Stage 2. The trade unions simultaneously and independently set wages.
Stage 3. The ﬁrms simultaneously and independently set quantities.
 Merger formation. The ownership structure of the industry is assumed to be formed through
a cooperative game of coalition formation. We make the assumption that only two-ﬁrm mergers
are allowed.24 Each production plant continues to exist after a merger, and it is not possible to
move the production of one brand from one plant to another, so the quintessence of a merger
is coordination on output decisions among the participating units. With two-ﬁrm mergers, we
are left with 6 possible market structures, comprising a combined total of 10 possible ownership
structures, that could emerge as an equilibrium outcome. Labelling country A as the “domestic”
country, we introduce the following notation to distinguish between the different market structures:
(i) No merger: M0 = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
(ii) One domestic (national) merger: MdN = {12, 3, 4}.
(iii) One foreign (national) merger: M fN = {1, 2, 34}.
(iv) Two national mergers: MN N = {12, 34}.
(v) One international merger: MI = {13, 2, 4}, M ′I = {14, 2, 3}, M ′′I = {1, 23, 4}, M ′′′I =
{1, 24, 3}.
(vi) Two international mergers: MI I = {13, 24}, M ′I I = {14, 23}.
The solution procedure is based on Horn and Persson (2001a), who treat the merger process
as a cooperative game of coalition formation, where the players are free to communicate and write
binding contracts. Owners that agree on a merger can decide on any division of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts,
but payments between coalitions are not allowed. The approach then involves a comparison of any
two possible ownership structures Mi and M j , where Mi is said to dominate M j if the combined
proﬁts of the decisive group of owners are larger in Mi than in M j . The decisive group of owners
comprises the owners that are expected to be able to inﬂuence whether Mi will be formed instead
of M j , and vice versa. Given the above assumptions, owners belonging to identical coalitions
in the two structures cannot affect whether M j will be formed instead of Mi , but all remaining
owners can inﬂuence this choice and are thus decisive.25
To give a brief illustration of the main ideas in the model, consider a comparison between the
no-merger structure (M0) and the market structure with one domestic merger (MdN ). In this case
22 To ensure an interior solution, with nonnegative proﬁts for all ﬁrms in every possible market structure, we assume
that c < (1/2)(a − w).
23 We implicitly picture that international “liberalization” of the markets just took place, and that there were
pre-liberalization national bans on merger to monopoly. The starting point then is four independent ﬁrms.
24 It is straightforward but space-consuming to extend the model to allow for mergers that include three production
units. Three-ﬁrm mergers are more likely to be blocked by competition authorites, and the present focus on two-ﬁrm
mergers also makes the distinction between national and international merger more succinct.
25 See Horn and Persson (2001a) for a formal deﬁnition of decisive owners.
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owners 3 and 4 stand alone in both structures, so the decisive owners are the merger participants in
MdN , i.e., owners 1 and 2, and the dominance relation is determined by whether or not the merger
is proﬁtable for the participants. Now consider instead a comparison between a domestic and an
international merger, say between MdN and MI . For MdN to dominate MI it is not enough that (the
domestic) owners 1 and 2 prefer MdN over MI . If owner 3 is adversely affected by the formation
of MdN , this owner may want to persuade owner 1 to form MI instead, by offering a large share
of the surplus in this structure. Thus, three owners (1, 2, and 3) are decisive, and the dominance
relation is determined by a comparison of total proﬁts for these three owners in the two ownership
structures.
Finally, the solution concept is the core. Those structures that are in the core—i.e., the
structures that are undominated—are deﬁned as equilibrium ownership structures (EOS), which
then determine the equilibrium market structure (EMS).
3. Market structures and union wages
 In this section we present a detailed analysis of union wage responses to different market
structures, which to a large extent determines the outcome of the bargaining game between
owners. Due to the symmetric nature of the model, we can ease notation by introducing the
following notational shorthand: in market structures that involve one or more mergers, wkm and
wko refer to the equilibrium wage level for a merger participant and an outsider, respectively, in
market structure Mk . Similar notation is used for other equilibrium variables throughout. Variables
without subscript refer to the symmetric no-merger equilibrium.
Since equilibrium wages depend on the characteristics of the market structure, a merger
yields potentially both exogenous and endogenous cost synergies. As will be shown below, the
wage effects of mergers are also related to the magnitude of nonlabor cost savings. However, for
clarity of exposition, we will start out by discussing the case of no exogenous cost synergies, i.e.,
µ = 0. By a comparison of equilibrium wage expressions for different market structures, with
µ = 0, we derive the following result.26
Proposition 1. (µ = 0): wN Nm > wNo > wNm > w0 > w Io > w Im > w I Im .
Without exogenous merger synergies, there exists an unambiguous ranking of market struc-
tures with respect to union wages. Furthermore, using the no-merger structure as a benchmark, a
clear pattern arises: union wages are higher in any market structure involving national merger(s),
whereas the opposite is true in market structures involving international merger(s).27
The intuition behind these results can be found through a more careful scrutiny of the unions’
maximization problem. Consider the ﬁrst-order conditions for optimal wage setting by the trade
union in country A, given by
ni (·) + (wi − w)∂ni (·)
∂wi
+ (w j − w)∂n j (·)
∂wi
= 0, i, j = 1, 2; i = j, (6)
where ni (·) is the derived labor demand at ﬁrm i . Obviously, the ﬁrst-order conditions for optimal
wage setting by the trade union in country B are completely equivalent.
From (6) we see that the relationship between market structures and union wages potentially
works through two different channels. Mergers affect the wage level at ﬁrm i insofar as either
the demand for labor or the wage responsiveness of labor demand (the slope of the labor demand
curve)—evaluated at the pre-merger equilibrium wage level—changes as a result of the merger.
26 Expressions for equilibrium wages, employment, and proﬁts in each market structure are reported in Ap-
pendix A.
27 Lommerud, Straume, and Sørgard (2005) discuss how downstream mergers might inﬂuence the prices charged
by upstream ﬁrms (e.g., trade unions) with market power. In that article, we show that the main results, broadly speaking,
carry over to models with wage bargaining and/or Bertrand competition. Although the frameworks are different, the main
mechanisms are similar, so we expect this to be true also in the present framework.
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More speciﬁcally, a reduction (increase) in labor demand, or more (less) wage-responsive labor
demand, induces the trade union to set a lower wage.
For comparative purposes, the labor demand of ﬁrm i in M0 is given by
n0i (·) =
(2− b)(a − c)− 2(1 + b)wi + b
∑
j =i w j
4 + 4b − 3b2 , i = 1, . . . , 4. (7)
On the other hand, labor demand for merger participants and outside ﬁrms in a market structure
with one merger are given by28
nkm(·) =
(2− b)(a − c) + (2 + b)µc − (1+b)(2−b)(1−b) wm + 2b(1−b)w−m + b
∑
wo
2(2 + 3b − b2) , (8)
nko(·) =
2(a − c(1 + bµ))− 2(2+2b−b2)(2−b) wo + 2b(2−b)w−o + b
∑
wm
2(2 + 3b − b2) , (9)
k = N , I . In market structures with two mergers, labor demand for a merger participant is given
by29
nkm(·) =
2(a − c(1− µ))− (2+b(2−b))(1−b) wm + b(2+b)(1−b) w−m + b
∑
wm′
4(1 + 2b) , (10)
k = N N , I I .
Consider ﬁrst the wage effects of a national merger. A merger reduces the degree of product
market competition. With no exogenous cost synergies, this naturally causes labor demand to
fall for the merger participants. However, reduced product market competition also implies that
the equilibrium market shares of ﬁrms are less responsive to wage changes, which—since each
trade union controls both wm and w−m in market structures with national mergers—translates
directly into less wage-responsive labor demand for each trade union. This is easily conﬁrmed
by a comparison between (7) and (8)–(10). When labor demand gets less wage responsive, the
trade unions respond by increasing wages, and this effect always dominates the effect of a merger
on total labor demand.30 Naturally, this effect is also stronger in the market structure with two
national mergers.
In the case of just one national merger, Proposition 1 conﬁrms that wages are lower in the
country of the merger participants. This is due to the effect of the merger on labor demand for
the merging and nonmerging ﬁrms, respectively. At the pre-merger wages, the merged ﬁrm has
an incentive to cut back on production, which implies a reduction of labor demand. The outside
ﬁrms—being free-riders on the merger—have opposite incentives. In fact, comparing (8) and (9)
at the no-merger equilibrium, with µ = 0, we ﬁnd that nkm = (1−b/2)nko. This labor demand effect
causes wages to be lower for the merged ﬁrm, and the effect is stronger the less differentiated
products are. Consequently, there is a “raising rivals’ costs” effect of a national merger in this
case.
Now consider an international merger. The crucial feature of such a merger is that the merged
ﬁrm is able to scale production up at one plant and down at the other, and the two plants involved
rely on labor supply from different trade unions. When the trade unions are not able to control
both wm and w−m , this means that labor demand from each plant of the merged ﬁrm gets more
responsive to wage differentials between the two trade unions. The result is lower wages for the
internationally merged ﬁrm. The strength of this effect depends on the substitutability of products
in demand. The less differentiated the products are, the more intense is the merger-induced
28 The pairs of merger participants and outside ﬁrms are labelled (m,−m) and (o,−o), respectively.
29 The pairs of merger participants are labelled (m,−m) and (m′,−m′).
30 This effect of reduced product market competition on the wage sensitivity of labor demand is also identiﬁed, in
a somewhat different setting, by Dowrick (1989).
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competition between the trade unions. From (8) we see that limb→1(∂nIm/∂wm) → −∞, implying
that all union rents will be competed away in the merged ﬁrms if products are homogeneous.
In market structures with just one international merger, wages will also decrease for the out-
side ﬁrms, compared with the case of no merger. This is a labor demand effect. Since∂nko/∂wm > 0,
lower wages for the merged ﬁrm will reduce labor demand at the nonmerged ﬁrms. Consequently,
the trade unions will respond by lowering wages also for ﬁrms not participating in the merger.
Obviously, this effect also is stronger the less differentiated products are.
 Exogenous merger synergies. How does the presence of exogenous cost synergies inﬂu-
ence the wage effects of mergers? From (8)–(10) we see that nonlabor cost synergies affect total
labor demand in an unambiguous manner. More speciﬁcally, we see that
∂nkm(·)
∂µ
> 0 and ∂n
k
o(·)
∂µ
< 0.
The intuition is relatively straightforward. Nonlabor merger synergies imply a reduction of
marginal production costs. Ceteris paribus, the proﬁt-maximizing response by the merged ﬁrm
is to increase production, which implies an increase in the demand for labor. In the case of one
merger, the outside ﬁrms are affected through the improved competitive position of the merged
ﬁrm. Since production quantities are strategic substitutes, exogenous merger synergies will—
ceteris paribus—lead to a reduction of labor demand for the outside ﬁrms. Since µ does not affect
the slope of the labor demand curves, the (partial) effects of nonlabor cost savings on union wages
follow immediately: wages increase for the merger participants and decrease for the outside ﬁrms.
When allowing for exogenous merger synergies we can no longer make an unambiguous
ranking of market structure with respect to equilibrium wages. However, a relatively clear pattern
can still be established.
Proposition 2. (i) wNm > wi for all µ ∈ [0, 1], (ii) wi > w Im if µ < µ := [(4 + b)(2 − b)b(a −
c − w)]/[8c(1− b)(4− b)], and (iii) min{wNm , wN Nm } > max{w Im, w I Im } for all µ ∈ [0, 1].
Parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition show the wage effect of a national and an international
merger, respectively. A national merger always leads to increased wages for the merger partici-
pants. In fact, since ∂wkm/∂µ > 0, the presence of nonlabor synergies reinforces the wage effect
already established in Proposition 1. For an international merger, on the other hand, the opposite
holds true. In this case, the presence of nonlabor cost savings introduces two opposing forces on
union wage responses to a merger. An international merger thus leads to higher wages for the
merger participants if nonlabor cost savings are sufﬁciently large. Since the union-rivalry effect is
increasing in b, an international merger is more likely to result in higher wages when products are
more differentiated. Furthermore, a certain degree of product differentiation is necessary for the
nonlabor cost savings effect to dominate the union rivalry effect. Indeed, we see that limb→0 µ → 0
and limb→1 µ →∞.
Part (iii) of the proposition contains the most important result of this section, though. It
conﬁrms that—when comparing market structures with national and international merger(s)—
wages for the merger participants are always lower when they merge internationally. Both types
of merger may cause wages to rise, but when compared with national mergers, the intensiﬁed
interunion rivalry brought about by cross-border mergers always has a dampening effect on wages
for the merger participants.
4. Merger profitability and free-rider effects
 Before deriving the equilibrium of the endogenous merger game, it is instructive to consider
how a merger affects proﬁts for merger participants and outside ﬁrms. To place the model in a
relevant context, we can relate our analysis to two basic ﬁndings in the existing merger literature.
First, with exogenous (and linear) production costs we know that a certain degree of product
differentiation is necessary in order to make a two-ﬁrm merger in Cournot oligopoly proﬁtable
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(see, e.g., Deneckere and Davidson, 1985, and Lommerud and Sørgard, 1997). In a Cournot
model, a merger without cost savings will lead the merging parties to contract their output, while
outsiders expand. The more differentiated products are, the less the merged unit loses market
share to outsiders, and for sufﬁcient differentiation a merger is proﬁtable even in the Cournot
case. Second, a purely anticompetitive merger (which yields no cost synergies) is typically more
proﬁtable for ﬁrms not participating in the merger. This free-rider effect is frequently referred to
as the “merger paradox” (see also Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds, 1983).
Consider ﬁrst the effect of a single international merger. Using the no-merger equilibrium
as a benchmark, a straightforward comparison of equilibrium proﬁts (see Appendix A) produces
the following result.
Proposition 3. (i) π Im > π0 for all µ ∈ [0, 1], (ii) π Im > π Io for all µ ∈ [0, 1], and (iii) π0 > π Io
if µ > µ̂ := [(20− b2)(1− b)b(a − c − w)]/[12(2− b)(3b + 2)c].
An international merger is always proﬁtable for the participants, even if µ = 0. This is of
course due to the wage effect of such a merger. As shown in the previous section, the wage reduction
is larger the less differentiated products are, which helps explain why this effect is sufﬁciently large
to make an international merger proﬁtable for every degree of product differentiation. Furthermore,
it is always more proﬁtable to take part in an international merger, rather than being an outsider,
implying that the merger paradox is not a feature of an international merger in our model. Indeed,
if there are additional nonlabor cost synergies from a merger (i.e., µ > 0), an international merger
may actually be harmful for outside ﬁrms, as indicated by part (iii) of the proposition. We see that
µ̂ = 0 if b = 1, implying that µ > 0 is a sufﬁcient condition for outside ﬁrms to lose proﬁts from
the merger if products are homogeneous.
The proﬁtability of a national merger, on the other hand, is not easily characterized ana-
lytically. Instead, we illustrate the proﬁt effects of such a merger in Figure 1, for some given
parameter values. The different areas in the ﬁgure are deﬁned as follows:
A : π Nm < π0 < π No ,
B : π0 < π Nm < π No ,
C : π0 < π No < π Nm ,
D : π No < π0 < π Nm .
We observe the following general pattern: a higher degree of product differentiation and larger
nonlabor cost savings increase the likelihood of a national merger being proﬁtable (B+C+D), a
national merger being more proﬁtable for the participants than for outside ﬁrms (C+D), and a
national merger reducing the proﬁts of outside ﬁrms (D). The effect of nonlabor cost savings from
the merger is obvious. In the absence of such cost savings, a national merger can still be proﬁtable,
FIGURE 1
PROFIT EFFECTS OF A NATIONAL MERGER WHEN a = 1 AND w = c = 1/4
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provided that the beneﬁt of output coordination outweighs the wage increase following such a
merger. This is the case if products are sufﬁciently differentiated, which reduces the possibility
of outsiders to free-ride on the merger.31
5. Equilibrium market structure
 We now turn to the equilibrium solution of the full game. A comparison of the relevant proﬁt
expressions along the lines of the solution procedure sketched in Section 2 yields the following
unambiguous result.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium market structure is two international mergers for all parameter
conﬁgurations.
Proof. We can show that MI I dominates all other market structures, making it the unique equilib-
rium market structure. Due to the symmetry of the model, the dominance relations are determined
by the following conditions: MI I dom MI if π I Im > π Io ; MI I dom M0 if π I Im > π0; MI I dom
MN N if π I Im > π N Nm ; MI I dom MN if 2π I Im > π N Nm + π N No . The fulﬁllment of these conditions
is conﬁrmed by straightforward algebra. Q.E.D.
The intuition behind this result is naturally related to the wage effects of different types
of merger. Regarding the ﬁrms’ choice between merging domestically or internationally, the
market structure with two international mergers dominates any market structure involving national
merger(s) if the former structure yields higher industry proﬁts. This is, in turn, dependent on
how different types of merger affect the power struggle between employers and workers. As we
have shown in Section 3, the effective market power of trade unions is lower when ﬁrms merge
internationally rather than domestically, which implies that a larger share of the oligopoly rents
is extracted by the ﬁrms in the former case.32
Furthermore, for two international mergers to constitute an equilibrium market structure, the
second merger must be privately proﬁtable. For low degrees of product differentiation, and in
the eventual absence of nonlabor cost savings, this requires that the merger produce a sufﬁcient
saving of wage costs. Since the trade unions will keep wages relatively high in ﬁrms that are not
internationally merged, there is always a sufﬁcient potential for wage cost savings to make the
second international merger proﬁtable for the participants.
Obviously, due to the symmetry of the model, there are multiple equilibria, where the equi-
librium market structure is the set of two ownership structures, in both of which all owners merge
internationally.
6. Global welfare
 With regard to social welfare, the analysis of the previous section immediately raises the
following question: Will the “merger market forces” lead to socially desirable market struc-
tures? The answer to this question is obviously important in determining the optimal framing of
merger policy in open economies, and in this section we will highlight the implications for global
welfare—deﬁned as the sum of consumers’ surplus, proﬁts, and union utility—by making a social
ranking of market structures. Formally, global welfare in market structure Mk is given by
Wk = Uk −
4∑
i=1
pki q
k
i +
4∑
i=1
π ki + V kA + V kB , (11)
31 Different parameter conﬁgurations would produce a picture that is qualitatively similar to Figure 1. It is easily
shown that for µ = 0, the sign of equilibrium proﬁt differences is independent of the parameters a, c, and w. For µ > 0,
numerical simulations suggest that the curves in Figure 1 never cross in the valid (µ, b)-space.
32 By assuming a global market, a potentially important implication of domestic mergers is ignored. If domestic
markets were partially protected by trade costs, the market-power effect might make domestic mergers more proﬁtable.
See also Horn and Persson (2001b) for an analysis of domestic versus international merger—in a nonunionized setting—in
the presence of trade costs and segmented markets.
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which simpliﬁes to
Wk = Uk − [w + c(1− Diµ)]
4∑
i=1
nki . (12)
Note that the welfare function weighs incomes of different groups in society equally. Wage
payments and payments for goods therefore appear as mere transfers of money that do not inﬂuence
social welfare. In consequence, welfare is decided solely by the value to consumers of the goods
produced less the opportunity costs of the labor and nonlabor resources used as inputs.
A comparison of global welfare in the different market structures yields the following key
results.
Proposition 5. (i) MI I is always socially preferable to any market structure involving national
merger(s). (ii) MI I is the socially optimal market structure for all µ ∈ [0, 1] if b > .56.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The ﬁrst part of the proposition implies that national mergers are never socially optimal,
from a viewpoint of global welfare. Such mergers may increase global welfare, if nonlabor cost
synergies are sufﬁciently large, but market structures involving national merger(s) are always
socially dominated by the market structure with two international mergers. Furthermore, two in-
ternational mergers is the socially optimal market structure if the degree of product differentiation
is sufﬁciently low, regardless of the size of nonlabor cost savings. A comparison of Propositions
4 and 5 reveals a perfect correspondence between private and social merger incentives for this
case of relatively homogeneous goods.
The reason international mergers can be socially optimal here—even if µ = 0—while they
would not be in a model with exogenous production costs, is that the power struggle between labor
and capital not only lowers wages, but may also cause consumer prices to fall as a result. Since
national mergers have no such effect on wages, rather the opposite, they will never be socially
preferable unless nonlabor cost synergies are sufﬁciently large. But even if these synergies are
large enough to make national mergers welfare improving, the efﬁciency gains from international
mergers are always larger, due to the union wage effects.
An illustration of how the socially optimal market structure depends on the key parameters
b and µ is given in Figure 2 for a speciﬁc numerical example. We see that MI I is the socially
optimal market structure if the degree of product differentiation is sufﬁciently low (b > .56) or
nonlabor merger synergies are sufﬁciently large. In this speciﬁc example, nonlabor cost savings
of more than 2% are sufﬁcient to make MI I the optimal structure for every degree of product
differentiation.
On the other hand, if the exogenous merger synergy is nonexistent, or very low, the socially
optimal market structure is determined by the degree of product differentiation. For intermedi-
FIGURE 2
SOCIALLY OPTIMAL MARKET STRUCTURES a = 1 AND w = c = 1/4
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ate levels of differentiation, one international merger is socially preferable, whereas any merger
reduces global welfare if products are sufﬁciently differentiated. The intuition is relatively straight-
forward: if µ = 0, mergers can improve welfare only if they lead to reduced consumer prices, at
least for some brands. We know that only cross-border mergers can lead to such price reductions,
provided that wages are sufﬁciently reduced as a result of the merger(s). More speciﬁcally, the
wage reductions must outweigh the effect of increased market concentration. Since the strength of
the wage effect is decreasing in the degree of product differentiation, the market concentration ef-
fect is more likely to dominate the wage effect the more differentiated products are. Consequently,
MI and M0 are socially optimal for intermediate and low levels of differentiation, respectively.
7. Domestic welfare
 The evaluation of different market structures from a perspective of domestic welfare may
differ signiﬁcantly from evaluations with respect to global welfare.33 To analyze the impact of
mergers on domestic welfare, we make a couple of additional assumptions. First, we assume
that domestic consumers’ surplus constitutes a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of global consumers’ surplus.
Second, we assume that proﬁts are divided evenly between the owners taking part in a merger.34
Domestic welfare in market structure Mk is then given by
W Ak =
2∑
i=1
π ki + V kA + α
(
U −
4∑
i=1
pki q
k
i
)
. (13)
Consider ﬁrst the case of no exogenous cost savings from a merger. Figure 3 depicts the
pattern of the most-preferred market structure in the (b, α) plane when µ = 0.35 Comparing
Figures 2 and 3, we see that there is no conﬂict between domestic and global interests, from a
welfare point of view, as long as a sufﬁciently high share of consumers resides in the domestic
country. The domestically optimal market structure is then one (two) international merger(s)
for intermediate (high) levels of product differentiation, and no merger otherwise, precisely as
a concern for global welfare would dictate. However, if α is sufﬁciently low, the domestically
most-preferred market structure is a foreign national merger, which harms consumers but beneﬁts
domestic ﬁrms and workers through higher wages, employment, and proﬁts.
An equivalent illustration for the case of a 5% nonlabor merger synergy is provided in
Figure 4 for a speciﬁc numerical example. Again, comparing with Figure 2—which is based
on the same numerical example—we see that the presence of nonlabor cost savings increases
the correspondence between domestic and global interests. From both perspectives, the optimal
market structure is two international mergers, unless a relatively low share of consumers resides
in the domestic country and products are sufﬁciently close substitutes in demand. In the latter
case, a foreign national merger is still the most preferred structure, from a domestic point of view.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate a potential conﬂict, though, when it comes to coordination of
domestic antitrust policies across different countries, particularly for the case of nonexistent or
very low nonlabor merger synergies. Assume that a large share of the consumers, say α = .8,
resides in country A, and consider the case of µ = 0. In this case, the most preferred market
structure for country A is one (two) international merger(s) if the degree of product differentiation
is intermediate (high), and no merger otherwise. However, if 80% of consumers live in country
33 Konrad and Lommerud (2001) warn that any preferential treatment of domestic ﬁrms can be manipulated in the
following sense: foreign owners may sell their assets to domestic owners who then receive favorable treatment, but this
only makes the domestic buyers willing to pay a higher price for the assets in question, so the real beneﬁciaries are the
original foreign owners.
34 With the geographic distribution of owners ﬁxed, α of course becomes a measure of the extent to which consumers
relative to capital owners reside in the home country.
35 When µ = 0, the parameters a, w, and c can be factored out of the welfare expressions, implying that the social
ranking of different market structures does not depend on the numerical values of these parameters.
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FIGURE 3
DOMESTICALLY MOST-PREFERRED MARKET STRUCTURE WHEN µ = 0
A, then at most 20% of consumers in this market live in country B, and this country would
consequently prefer a foreign national merger.
Finally, we want to highlight the effect of a domestic merger on domestic welfare. Under
which circumstances will such a merger improve domestic welfare?
Proposition 6. There exists µ > 0 such that a domestic merger is detrimental to domestic welfare
when µ < µ.
The proof lies in a straightforward evaluation of W AN (d) − W A0 and W AN N − W AN ( f ).
Assume that there are no exogenous merger synergies, i.e., µ = 0. In this case, the proposition
implies that if national competition policy is governed by considerations for domestic welfare, as
deﬁned by (13), the antitrust authorities should never allow a domestic merger. This holds even
if α = 0, which means that the proposed merger’s effect on consumers’ surplus is irrelevant for
domestic welfare. Thus, even if a domestic merger is proﬁtable, the decrease in domestic union
rents, due to a loss of employment, more than outweighs the increase in proﬁts. Such a merger
beneﬁts domestic welfare only if nonlabor cost savings are sufﬁciently large. Note also that it can
be shown that even when a domestic merger is welfare improving, it will still not be part of the
most preferred market structure from a domestic welfare viewpoint, in line with Figures 3 and 4.
For the case of µ = 0, this result mirrors the result in Brander and Spencer (1985). They
found that a government should pay a subsidy to a domestic ﬁrm operating in a foreign Cournot
market. The subsidy is a commitment device that helps the ﬁrm behave more aggressively and
FIGURE 4
DOMESTICALLY MOST-PREFERRED MARKET STRUCTURE
WHEN µ = .05, a = 1, AND w = c = 1/4
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shift proﬁts to its own country. In our setting, a national merger results in higher wages, which
is the opposite of paying a subsidy to the ﬁrm. This implies that the Cournot ﬁrm operating in a
foreign market is committed to act less aggressively when it faces higher wages after the merger,
thereby reducing the combined sum of proﬁts and union rent. This result questions the idea that
lax domestic merger policy can substitute for strategic trade policy or other activist industrial
policies to build up national champions. The above reasoning tells us that the nonintervention
market structure outcome may not be the domestic welfare optimal one. But if there is a problem,
the problem is too many international mergers, not that one would want domestic mergers instead
of international ones. Strict merger policy toward all kinds of mergers should then be the choice,
not lax merger policy only for domestic mergers.
8. Noncooperative merger formation
 In the previous analysis we applied a cooperative merger formation model ﬁrst introduced
in Horn and Persson (2001a). In many markets, though, merger formation resembles a noncoop-
erative game. For example, ﬁrms merge as a result of an acquisition. In this section we introduce
two simple versions of a noncooperative acquisition game and compare our results with the ones
reported in Section 5. In line with the previous analysis, we restrict the attention to two-ﬁrm
mergers, i.e., one ﬁrm acquiring only one other ﬁrm.
First, let us consider a sequential acquisition game, which is played in two stages according
to the following rules: at each stage, one ﬁrm is given the role as an initial bidder.36 It decides to
bid or not on a target ﬁrm of its own choice. If it bids, then other ﬁrms not already involved in
an acquisition can also bid for the target. We assign ﬁrm 1 the role of initial bidder at stage 1. It
decides whether or not to make a bid, and chooses the target ﬁrm if it decides to bid. Furthermore,
ﬁrm 2 is the initial bidder at stage 2 if it was not the target at stage 1. Otherwise, ﬁrm 3 is the initial
bidder at stage 2. If a ﬁrm is indifferent between bidding and not bidding, we assume that the
ﬁrm bids. The game is illustrated in Figure 5, where we have speciﬁed the proﬁts for the bidder
and the target, respectively. Note that when there are two acquisitions, the proﬁts of the stage-2
bidder and target are listed before the corresponding stage-1 proﬁts.
In Appendix B we show that the outcome of such an acquisition game is two international
acquisitions, which is identical to the outcome of the cooperative merger model. This should not
be a surprise. As shown in the previous sections, the ﬁrms that merge internationally will always
be better off, and it is always better to be an insider than an outsider. Note, though, that in this
particular setting the target ﬁrm at stage 1 and the bidder ﬁrm at stage 2 are the ones with the
highest proﬁt. The latter ﬁrm gains from no competition from other bidders, while the target ﬁrm
at stage 1 gains from competition for being an acquiring ﬁrm at stage 1 and thereby avoiding
being a target at stage 2. However, the two remaining ﬁrms (the bidder at stage 1 and the target
at stage 2) are also better off compared with the case if no acquisitions at all.
Second, let us also consider a simultaneous acquisition game. To simplify, we assign the
roles as bidders to ﬁrms 1 and 3. They decide simultaneously whether or not to make bids for the
two target ﬁrms. Each of the acquiring ﬁrms can bid on both target ﬁrms (2 and 4), but one bidder
can only acquire one ﬁrm. As we show in Appendix B, the equilibrium outcome of this game is
also two international acquisitions. Each target ﬁrm receives the proﬁts it could have earned by
turning down the offer, while the two bidding ﬁrms capture the remaining proﬁts generated by
two international acquisitions.
We summarize our result as follows.
Proposition 7. Two international acquisitions is the equilibrium outcome of the described non-
cooperative acquisition games.
36 Both in this game and the subsequent simultaneous game, one could imagine an initial stage where there was
a lottery to determine which role each ﬁrm should have. This would preserve the symmetry of the model, and all ﬁrms
would have the same ex ante proﬁt.
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FIGURE 5
PROFITS OF THE BIDDER (B ) AND THE TARGET (T )
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
9. Some concluding remarks
 In this article we have explored how the presence of trade union power can affect the pattern
of mergers in an international oligopoly. A core idea is that a merger triggers wage changes. Our
model can then be seen as a merger model with endogenous costs. But in contrast to the received
literature, a merger may affect costs for all ﬁrms in the industry.37 This has important implications
for merger policy. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) argued that a sufﬁcient criterion for a merger to
improve welfare is that it leads to lower product prices. They propose a simple criterion for when
a merger results in lower product prices.38 It speciﬁes how large the reduction in the merging
ﬁrm’s marginal costs must be for consumer prices to fall. If the merging ﬁrm lowers product
prices, the nonmerging ﬁrm is expected to do the same. However, our results illustrate that such
a criterion can be misleading, because marginal costs change for the nonmerging ﬁrms as well.
One cannot consider only the merging ﬁrm’s pricing decision to tell whether consumers beneﬁt
or not. For example, with an international merger one could have that the merging ﬁrm sets a
higher output price while the nonmerging ﬁrm sets a lower output price. By using the Farrell and
Shapiro criterion for that particular example, one would only concentrate on the merged ﬁrm’s
price increase and forget the outside ﬁrm’s price cut. In fact, the output price of a nonmerging
ﬁrm may change even if the output price of the merging ﬁrm does not.
According to our predictions, a national merger is expected to lead to higher wages, while
an international merger is expected to have the opposite effect on wages, at least if nonlabor cost
savings are not too large. It is an empirical question whether this in fact happens. Unfortunately,
there are no empirical studies that test for the wage effect of an international versus a national
merger. One recent study, though, can shed some light on the issue. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004)
test empirically how mergers affect employment. They found that in the United Kingdom, a
domestic merger reduces employment by much more than cross-border deals made by U.K.
acquiring ﬁrms. This is consistent with a prediction saying that national mergers are more wage-
increasing than cross-border mergers. However, apart from the fact that there is no direct link
37 The ﬁrst study that introduced internal cost savings following a merger was Perry and Porter (1985). A merger
resulted in an internal change in how ﬁrms operated their crucial assets. It triggered lower marginal costs, but only for the
merged ﬁrm.
38 Farrell and Shapiro (1990) consider only an industry with identical products. Werden (1996) extends their
criterion to the case of an industry with differentiated products.
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between employment effects and wage changes, one should be careful with the interpretation of
their results, since their study is not tailored to test the predictions from our theory.39,40 This calls
for more detailed empirical studies. The structure of the labor market should be taken into account
when testing directly for wage effects following different kinds of mergers. This is an issue for
future research.
Finally, it is important to stress that our conclusions are reached within a fairly stylized
modelling framework. Thus, we cannot claim a high degree of generality for all of our results.
However, the main contribution of our article is the identiﬁcation of certain mechanisms that might
be important in explaining merger patterns in unionized international oligopolies: in essence, how
cross-border merger might be an effective mechanism for ﬁrms to curtail trade union power and
thereby obtain wage cost savings. These mechanisms are related to demand substitutability of
products, and thus indirectly labor, and clearly generalize beyond the linear speciﬁcation of
demand and cost functions. On the other hand, the precise implications of these wage effects,
with respect to merger proﬁtability and welfare, obviously depend on the relative strengths of
different opposing forces, which are determined by the exact speciﬁcation of market structure,
technology, and preferences.
Appendix A
 Equilibrium expressions for employment, wages, and proﬁts in the different market structures follow.
 No merger (M0). Equilibrium employment, wages, and proﬁts for a ﬁrm in M0 are given by
n0 =
(2 + b)(a − c − w)
4(2 + 3b) , (A1)
w0 = (1/4)[(2 − b)(a − c) + w(2 + b)], (A2)
π0 =
(a − c − w)2(b + 2)2
16(3b + 2)2 . (A3)
 One national merger (MN). Equilibrium employment, wages, and proﬁts for merger participants and outsiders
in MN are given by
nNm =
(2 + b)[(2 + 2b − b2)(a − c − w) + µc(2 + 3b)]
2(2 + 3b − b2)(4 + 6b + b2) , (A4)
nNo =
(1 + b)[(4 + 4b − b2)(a − c − w) − µcb(2 + b)]
2(2 + 3b − b2)(4 + 6b + b2) , (A5)
wNm =
(2 + 2b − b2)(a − c) + 2w(1 + b)2 + µc(2 + 3b)
4 + 6b + b2
, (A6)
wNo =
(4 + 4b − b2)(a − c) + w(2 + b)(2 + 3b) − µcb(2 + b)
2(4 + 6b + b2) , (A7)
π Nm =
(2 + b)2(1 + b)[(2 + 2b − b2)(a − c − w) + µc(2 + 3b)]2
4(4 + 6b + b2)2(2 + 3b − b2)2 , (A8)
π No =
(b + 1)2[(4 + 4b − b2)(a − c − w) − µcb(b + 2)]2
4(4 + 6b + b2)2(2 + 3b − b2)2 . (A9)
 Two national mergers (MNN). Equilibrium employment, wages, and proﬁts for a merger participant in MN N
are given by
nN Nm =
(1 + b)[a − w − c(1 − µ)]
2(1 + 2b)(2 + b) , (A10)
39 There are no data to control for the structure of the labor market, and when comparing national and international
mergers, they do not distinguish between related and unrelated mergers. Only in the former do we expect that market
power in the product market matters. Note also that for continental Europe, they found only minor differences in the
employment effect of national and international mergers.
40 As pointed out by the Editor, there is also a potential problem of selection bias in such studies, as ﬁrms choose
to merge cross-border as opposed to domestically, which may inﬂuence the wage effects.
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wN Nm =
a + w(1 + b) − c(1 − µ)
2 + b
, (A11)
π N Nm =
[a − w − c(1 − µ)]2(1 + b)3
4(2 + b)2(1 + 2b)2 . (A12)
 One international merger (MI). Equilibrium employment, wages, and proﬁts for merger participants and
outsiders in MI are given by
nIm =
(2 − b)[(8 − b2)(a − c − w) + cµ(8 + 6b − b2)]
2(2 + 3b − b2)(16 − 12b + b2) , (A13)
nIo =
(4 − b)(2 − b2)(a − c − w) − µc3b(2 − b)
(2 + 3b − b2)(16 − 12b + b2) , (A14)
w Im =
2(1 − b)[2(2 − b)(a − c) + µc(4 − b)] + w(8 − 3b2)
16 − 12b + b2 , (A15)
w Io =
(2 − b)[(4 − 3b)(a − c) − µcb] + 2w(4 − b − b2)
16 − 12b + b2 , (A16)
π Im =
(2 − b)2(1 + b)[(8 − b2)(a − c − w) + µc(8 + 6b − b2)]2
4(16 − 12b + b2)2(2 + 3b − b2)2 , (A17)
π Io =
[(4 − b)(2 − b2)(a − c − w) − 3µcb(2 − b)]2
(16 − 12b + b2)2(2 + 3b − b2)2 . (A18)
 Two international mergers (MII). Equilibrium employment, wages, and proﬁts for a merger participant in MI I
are given by
nI Im =
(2 + b)[a − w − c(1 − µ)]
2(1 + 2b)(4 − b) , (A19)
w I Im =
2(1 − b)[a − c(1 − µ)] + w(2 + b)
4 − b , (A20)
π I Im =
[a − w − c(1 − µ)]2(2 + b)2(1 + b)
4(4 − b)2(1 + 2b)2 . (A21)
Appendix B
 Proofs of Propositions 5 and 7 follow.
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) Using the equilibrium expressions reported in Appendix A, and the deﬁnition of global welfare
given in (11), we can derive
WI I − WN N = [a − w − c(1 − µ)]
2b(24 + 41b − 9b2 − 8b3)
2(4 − b)2(2 + b)2(1 + 2b) > 0 (B1)
and
WI I − WN = b
2(a − c − w)2 + µc(2 + b)(2(a − c − w) + µc)
4(2 + 3b − b2)2(6b + b2 + 4)2(4 − b)2(1 + 2b)2 , (B2)
where
 = 896 + 6912b + 20 872b2 + 29 644b3 + 15 954b4 − 5583b5 − 8408b6 − 222b7 + 1409b8 − 110b9 − 26b10,
 = 896 + 6272b + 16 104b2 + 16 356b3 − 52b4 − 10 954b5 − 4642b6 + 1407b7 + 751b8 − 98b9 − 18b10,
 = 1760 + 10 736b + 22 876b2 + 16 356b3 − 6147b4 − 10 673b5 + 26b6 + 1880b7 − 190b8 − 30b9.
It is easily veriﬁed that , , and  are all nonnegative for b ∈ (0, 1), which implies that WI I − WN > 0.
(ii) It remains to verify that WI I > max{WI , W0} for b > .56. We have that
WI I − WI = b(a − c − w)
2 + µc(2F(a − c − w) + µcϒ)
4(2 + 3b − b2)2(16 − 12b + b2)2(4 − b)2(1 + 2b)2 , (B3)
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where
 = −6144 + 2304b + 35 328b2 − 23 888b3 − 47 312b4 + 55 140b5 − 7192b6 − 13 101b7
+ 6763b8 − 1238b9 + 78b10,
ϒ = 28 672 + 73 728b − 79 616b2 − 224 640b3 + 127 808b4 + 174 032b5 − 147 412b6 + 24 380b7
+ 6459b8 − 2297b9 + 186b10 − 2b11,
F = 28 672 + 100 352b + 20 480b2 − 192 640b3 − 42 896b4 + 160 496b5 − 21 772b6 − 42 298b7
+ 19 153b8 − 2581b9 + 2b10 + 14b11.
The denominator in (B3) is obviously positive for b ∈ (0, 1), so the sign of (WI I − WI ) is determined by the sign of the
numerator. Within the relevant range of b it is easily veriﬁed that  > 0 if b > .56, ϒ > 0 if b < .78, and F > 0 for
b ∈ (0, 1). The sign of the second term in the numerator of (B3) can be determined by noting that both F and ϒ reach their
minimal value on [0, 1] at b = 1. It follows that if (2F(a− c−w) +µcϒ) > 0 for b = 1, then (2F(a− c−w) +µcϒ) > 0
for b ∈ (0, 1). Setting b = 1, 2F(a − c − w) + 2µcϒ reduces to 18(2998(a − c − w) − 1039cµ), which is positive for
c < (1/2)(a − w). It follows that WI I − WI > 0 for µ ∈ [0, 1] if  > 0, which is true for b > .56.
Finally, we have that
WI I − W0 = (2 + b)[(2b − 1)(a − c − w)
2 + 4µc(2(a − c − w) + µc)]
8(4 − b)2(2b + 1)2(3b + 2)2 , (B4)
where
 = b(48 + 126b + 25b2 − 73b3 + 6b4) > 0,
 = (14 + 21b − 11b2)(3b + 2)2 > 0.
We see that WI I − W0 > 0 for µ ∈ [0, 1] if b > 1/2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. Consider ﬁrst the sequential acquisition game. We solve the game by backward induction. At
stage 2 there are three possibilities:
(i) No bid at stage 1. Firm 2 is the designated bidder. If it does not bid, there will be no acquisitions, and proﬁts are
π0 for all ﬁrms. If ﬁrm 2 chooses to bid on another ﬁrm, the other domestic ﬁrm (ﬁrm 1) or one of the foreign
ﬁrms (3 or 4) will be the target. First, let us assume that ﬁrm 2 bids on ﬁrm 1. If ﬁrm 2 acquires ﬁrm 1, total
proﬁts for the two ﬁrms would be 2π Nm . However, the two foreign ﬁrms can also bid. If one of them wins, total
proﬁts for those two ﬁrms will be 2π Im . Since 2π Im > 2π0, ﬁrm 1 will accept a bid of π0 + ε from either of the
foreign ﬁrms (3 or 4). But such a bid is not an equilibrium, since the other foreign ﬁrm will have an incentive to
bid higher. In fact, a bidding competition between the two foreign ﬁrms would result in a bid of B = 2π Im −π Io ,
which is the reservation bid for each of the foreign ﬁrms. The initial bidder will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to match
such a bid. It knows that if it does not win, it earns π Io , while if it wins, it earns 2π Nm − B . Its reservation
bid would then be B = 2π Nm − π Io . Since 2π Im > 2π Nm , we will observe an international rather than a national
acquisition. Second, let us assume that ﬁrm 2 decides to bid on ﬁrm 3, which is a ﬁrm in the foreign country.
From the above discussion we see that it can succeed with such an acquisition if it bids B = 2π Im −π Io , making
a proﬁt of π Io . Since π Io > π0, this implies that making a bid would make ﬁrm 2 is strictly better off, and there
will be an international acquisition in equilibrium.
(ii) A national acquisition at stage 1. Firm 1 acquires ﬁrm 2 at stage 1, and there is no longer the possiblity of
an international acquisition. At stage 2, there will either be no acquisition or a national acquisition. If ﬁrm 3
decides not to bid, there will be no acquisition, and its proﬁt is equal to π No . On the other hand, if ﬁrm 3 wants
to acquire ﬁrm 4, it has to bid B ≥ π No , which are the proﬁts of the target ﬁrm in case of no acquisition. The
acquiring ﬁrm will then earn 2π N Nm − π No . Since 2π N Nm − π No > π No only for some parameter values, the
outcome is generally ambiguous.
(iii) An international acquisition at stage 1. If ﬁrm 2 decides not to bid, then there will be no acquisition. In such
a case its proﬁt is equal to π Io . On the other hand, if ﬁrm 2 wants to acquire the available (foreign) target, it has
to bid B ≥ π Io , making a proﬁt of 2π I Im − π Io . Since 2π I Im − π Io > π Io for all parameter values, there will be
an international acquisition in equilibrium.
Turning now to stage 1 of the game, there are two possibilities to consider:
(i) No bid at stage 1. We know from the above analysis that if no acquisition occurs at stage 1, there will be an
international acquisition at stage 2. It implies that ﬁrm 2 acquires either ﬁrm 3 or 4, and ﬁrm 1 is the outsider,
making a proﬁt of π Io .
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(ii) A bid at stage 1. The bidding ﬁrm can bid either on a national or an international ﬁrm at stage 1. We will discuss
each of those alternatives. To simplify the presentation, let us assume that if a national acquisition occurs at
stage 1, there will be a second national acquisition at stage 2. It can easily be shown that our conclusion will
not change if we assumed that there would be no second national acquisition. If ﬁrm 1 bids on ﬁrm 2, then
ﬁrm 4 will be the one of the two remaining ﬁrms with the lowest proﬁts if ﬁrm 1 succeeds, earning π No . Its
reservation bid for ﬁrm 2 at the ﬁrst stage of the game will then be B = 2π I Im − π No . Firm 1 can only succeed
if it matches such a bid. If so, it earns 2π N Nm − (2π I Im − π No ). Similarly, if ﬁrm 1 bids on ﬁrm 3, ﬁrm 4 will be
the one of the remaining two ﬁrms with the lowest proﬁts if ﬁrm 1 succeeds. If it succeeds, ﬁrm 4 earns π Io . Its
reservation bid will then be B = 2π I Im − π Io . Firm 1 can only succeed if it matches such a bid. If so, it earns
2π I Im − (2π I Im − π Io ) = π Io . By comparison we see that ﬁrm 1 will be better off with a bid on ﬁrm 3 rather than
ﬁrm 2 if π Io > 2π N Nm − (2π I Im − π No ). It can easily be veriﬁed that this is always true, which implies that we
will observe an international acquisition, if any, at stage 1 of the game.
Finally, we have to check whether there will be any acquisition at all at stage 1. We see that ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt is π Io , both
in the case of no bid and in the case of a bid on ﬁrm 3. Given that each ﬁrm by assumption would bid if it were indifferent,
ﬁrm 1 will bid at stage 1 and make an international acquisition.
Now consider the simultaneous acquisition game. Our procedure is to show that a unilateral deviation is proﬁtable
in all cases, except for the market structure with two international acquisitions.
(i) No acquisitions. Firm 1 will obviously ﬁnd it proﬁtable to bid π0 on the target ﬁrm 4 and earn 2π Im −π0 > 0.
(ii) One national acquisition. Assume that ﬁrm 1 bids on ﬁrm 2. It must offer ﬁrm 2 at least π0, and ﬁrm 1 can
earn at most 2π Nm − π0. But then ﬁrm 3 will deviate. It can bid π0 + ε and earn 2π Im − π0 − ε, which is strictly
better than π No .
(iii) One international acquisition. As explained in the discussion of stage 2 of the sequential game, the second
initial bidder will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate by acquiring the second target.
(iv) Two national acquisitions. Each of the bidders can earn at most 2π N Nm − π No by bidding π No , the outside
option for the target ﬁrm. However, a bidder can deviate by bidding π No + ε for the other target ﬁrm, earning
2π Im − π No − ε. Since 2π Im > 2π N Nm , this deviation is proﬁtable if ε is sufﬁciently close to zero.
(v) Two international acquisitions. Each of the bidders can earn at most 2π I Im − π Io by bidding π Io . A bidder can
deviate by bidding π Io + ε for the other target ﬁrm, earning 2π Nm −π Io − ε. Since 2π I Im > 2π Nm , such a deviation
is not proﬁtable. Furthermore, since 2π I Im − π Io > π Io , it is not proﬁtable to withdraw its own bid and be an
outsider ﬁrm in a market with one international acquisition. Q.E.D.
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